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MANDATORY ACCESS AND THE INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
Andrew D. Auerbach*
The First Amendment to the Constitution limits
government action that diminishes the freedom to
speak but creates no affirmative duties upon the gov-
ernment to promote speech.' The First Amendment
now, however, is being recast as an invitation for ac-
tive government regulation by those interested in cre-
ating a system where an active government improves
our nation's discourse. This system is called
mandatory access and is characterized by government
regulations that compel media owners, such as cable
television operators, to carry governmentally pre-
ferred programming.
This Article discusses existing and proposed
mandatory access laws and the effect of mandatory
access laws on the media. Part I describes existing
mandatory access laws as well as congressional ini-
tiatives to enact additional mandatory access laws.
Part II examines the constitutional and policy argu-
ments fueling the mandatory access laws. Part III
analyzes Congress' authority to promulgate the
mandatory access laws through the spending power
clause of the Constitution. Part IV examines the
risks inherent in the progression from access regula-
tion to the escalation of government control. This
Article concludes that, while mandatory access pro-
posals may appear to further the public interest, the
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
' Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1642 (1967); CASS
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
(1993); Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amend-
ment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1062, 1086 (1994).
' JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR
WHOM? 321 (1973); Dominic Caristi, The Concept of a Right
to Access to the Media: A Workable Alternative, 12 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 103, 109-10 (1988). "When a select few individuals
have the ability to restrict access, freedom of expression is en-
government's ability to engage in onerous content
control of video programming results in pervasive
harm that is both alarming and quite real.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: MANDATORY
ACCESS AND THE INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
Mandatory access is one process by which the gov-
ernment curtails the editorial discretion of cable
companies, direct broadcast satellite servers, and tele-
phone companies. Ironically, mandatory access laws
that force telecommunication companies to be the
mouthpieces of others are said to be required by the
First Amendment.2 Advocates for government-com-
pelled access to the media are concerned that the
First Amendment no longer effectively protects
"First Amendment values." These advocates reason
that if the media owners have the ability to restrict
access, the First Amendment values of free and ro-
bust discussion will wither, because then the only
substantive viewpoint that will be heard is the video
publisher's.8
Other mandatory access proponents contend that
media owners' speech is problematic because it is
both homogeneous and inane.' Such proponents
dangered just as surely as if the restriction had been imposed by
the government." Id.
' Video programming suffers, it is said, from the need to en-
tertain rather than inform. Ideas come dressed "in the carnival
attire of the violent or bizarre." BARRON, supra note 3, at 7. In
addition, television dependency on advertiser generated revenues
translates into programming targeted to the largest audience.
The largest audience is reached by appealing to the lowest com-
mon denominator. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover,
The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1087, 1095 (1990). The unelevated status of commercial
television is bewailed most famously in FCC Chairman Newton
Minow's May 9th, 1961 address to the National Association of
Broadcasters:
When television is bad, nothing is worse .... I can as-
sure you that you will observe a vast wasteland. You will
see a procession of game shows, violence, audience partici-
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claim that existing programs do not devote enough
time to "local and national public affairs, [and] chil-
dren's matters," and that the viewpoints dissemi-
nated by programmers reflect the "capitalistic goals
of privately owned, for-profit media."5
[M]uch of the free speech 'market' now consists of scan-
dals, sensationalized anecdotes, and gossip, often about fa-
mous movie stars and athletes; deals rarely with serious
issues and then almost never in depth; usually offers con-
clusions without reasons; turns much political discussion
into the equivalent of advertisements; . . and reflects an
accelerating "race to the bottom" in terms of the quality
and quantity of attention that it requires.6
The problem is found with the content of the broad-
casters' speech, thus resulting in solutions that them-
selves are aimed at regulating the content. Specifi-
cally, in the case of the newer media forums, such as
cable, telephone company video platforms,7 and di-
rect broadcast satellite ("DBS"),8 the solutions actu-
ally compel the carriage of government approved
speech. By way of extreme example, some suggest
co-opting an hour of prime-time television and drive-
time radio each day for broadcasts by an "Audience
Network," a dispenser of "truly diverse program-
ming from a variety of sources which reflects the
needs and interests of all citizens."9
Mandatory access laws, thus, are sought to im-
prove what is considered to be "bad" television. Even
assuming arguendo that correcting the poor quality
of speech is a proper governmental function, the ba-
sic concept still misses the mark. It is the success of
video providers like cable television that has spurred
the demands for access. Yet, it is the very success of
the cable industry that greatly has increased the
pation shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable
families, blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism,
murder, western badmen, western good men, private eyes,
gangsters, more violence, and cartoons, and endlessly,
commercials - many screaming, cajoling and offending.
And most of all, boredom.
Reprinted in JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 198 (1991).
' Caristi, supra note 3, at 108.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 23.
Video platforms are an "'electronic platform' or 'window'
that opens to a broader network, giving the user access to video
and non-video communication services provided by a multiplicity
of competitive service providers. Through this platform, consum-
ers could gain access to video programs (provided by entities
other than the local exchange carrier), competing video and vide-
otext gateways, videophone, and other communication services.
In re Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership
Rules, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd.
300, para. 6 (1991) (hereinafter Further NPRM). Ultimately,
the FCC envisions that telephone companies will create "video
quality of video programming.
Prior to the advent of cable television, the major
commercial broadcast networks were supported
solely by advertising revenue, which traditionally has
been measured by audience size. To effectively com-
pete, each commercial network attempted to increase
the size of its audience by programming to the lowest
common denominator.10 Today, however, it is the
vigorous competition between cable television, DBS,
and telephone video platforms that will cause pro-
gram quality to increase. The improvement of pro-
gram quality will occur for two reasons. First, be-
cause these new providers have a dual revenue
stream (i.e. they receive advertising dollars and they
charge viewers), they are less dependent on audience
size and are less in need of the mass audience re-
sponse. The independence of multiple channel video
providers enables them to program quality shows
even if their appeal is limited to a smaller segment of
the market. Second, an increase in programmers nec-
essarily will create a greater variety of high quality
television. As the number of programmers increases,
it will become profitable to program for the smaller
"upper end" of the viewing market.1" The profound
changes in the 1980's television market confirm this
analysis. For example, during this time period, cable
networks began to offer quality programs that were
once the exclusive realm of public television. 2 This
change illustrates that mandatory access increasingly
is unnecessary as more and more viable commercial
,video providers enter the market.
Ironically, mandatory access laws threaten the via-
bility of video providers and the high-quality televi-
sion they deliver. Proposed mandatory access laws
common carriage," a switched broadband network. Id. paras. 6-
7.
S DBS distributors broadcast their signals from high pow-
ered satellites to homes equipped with small satellite-receive dish
antennas. Currently, there are two competing providers of DBS
service who share a satellite: DirecTV and U.S. Satellite Broad-
casting. Both offer a package of basic, premium, and pay-per-
view options similar to cable. Englewood, Colorado-based
EchoStar Communications plans to launch a similar satellite ser-
vice by the fall of 1995. See Nikhil Hutheessing, Kamikaze
Satellites, FORBES, July 4, 1994, at 126.
o Ralph Nader and Claire Riley, Oh Say Can You See: A
Broadcast Network for the Audience, 5 J.L. & POL. 1, 5 (1988).
10 BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WIDMAN, VIDEO Eco-
NOMICs 142 (1992). The lowest common denominator is a term
that refers to programming elements enjoyed by the most people.
Id. So, while the science of Nova is appreciated by many, the
violence of NYPD Blue may be capable of entertaining these
same viewers and many more.




could burden telecommunication entities with
prohibitously high costs.' Unfortunately, such com-
panies will not be able to build rapidly a comprehen-
sive and advanced information infrastructure if they
do not receive a return on their investment.' 4 The
promise of the information superhighway, including
a diverse selection of high quality programming,
may prove impossible to keep under onerous govern-
mental regulation and mandates.
A. Current Mandatory Access Requirements
Many mandatory access laws already are in place.
This section analyzes each media forum that is af-
fected by existing mandatory access laws. In each
case, the government has reduced the editorial op-
tions available to media operators in order to foster a
greater number of speakers, or what the government
believes to be a more delicate balance of opinions
than the free market might provide.
18 See, e.g., S. 2195, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (taxing
cable, DBS, and telephone company video platforms, proposing
to use the money to fund public broadcasters, governments, and
nonprofit organizations that create educational and cultural pro-
gramming, and conscripting up to 20% of channel capacity to
carry the programming).
Testimony by bill advocates reveals that mandatory access
could prove to be extremely expensive. In his testimony in sup-
port of S. 2195, Anthony Riddle, Chair of the Alliance for Com-
munity Media, questioned:
If, in order to use the network, one needs a video camera,
editing equipment and playback equipment, who will
have access to it, even if the fiber link is built to every
home? If, in order to take advantage of the network, one
requires a computer, who will provide the computers to
those who will cannot afford them now? . . . This sug-
gests that from the start the network must be designed so
that its basic services include facilities, equipment and ser-
vices required to make the information highway accessible
to the entire community.
Anthony Riddle, Chair, Alliance for Community Media, Testi-
mony in support of S. 2195, (June 22, 1994). See also S. 1822,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 201B(c)(1) (1994). This bill, passed by
the Senate Commerce Committee, reserves up to 5% of the ca-
pacity of telecommunications entities for certain groups and al-
lows telecommunication companies to recover out-of-pocket costs
only.
14 Nearly 20 years ago, the FCC acknowledged the retard-
ant effect expensive mandatory access regulations had on system
construction. In re Cable TV Channel Capacity and Access Re-
quirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
Is See Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969) (holding that the fairness doctrine and its corol-
laries-the personal attack and political editorial rules-did not
1. Terrestrial broadcasters
Broadcasters are forced to surrender a substantial
amount of editorial discretion in order to allow the
government to inject "balance" into our national de-
bates.15 The now-inoperative fairness doctrine," the
personal attack rule," the equal opportunities rule,'8
and the political editorials rule' 9 all require broad-
casters to relinquish their facilities for use as a pul-
pit by others.
Broadcasters' unenviable position in the First
Amendment's hierarchy of protection stems from its
chaotic birth. The interference caused by dueling
broadcasters and the limited capacity of the spectrum
was held to justify "differences in the First Amend-
ment standards applied to them.""0
2. Cable Television Systems
Local governments may bar a cable operator from
constructing a cable system if the operator refuses to
provide free channels for public, educational, or gov-
violate the First Amendment, and that, in adopting the fairness
doctrine legislation, the FCC simply was implementing Congres-
sional policy).
16 See In re Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licen-
sees, Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246, para. 7 (1949). The fairness doc-
trine required broadcasters to present coverage of controversial
issues of public importance in their communities, and to provide
reasonable opportunities for the expression of contrasting view-
points on those issues. The FCC stopped enforcing the doctrine
in In re General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast
Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 147 (1985). This decision
was affirmed in Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654,
669 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
" 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1993). Section 73.1920 provides
that:
When, during the presentation of views on a controversial
issue of public importance, an attack is made upon the
honesty, character, integrity or like personal qualities of
an identified person or group, the licensee shall, within a
reasonable time . . . transmit to the persons or group at-
tacked: . . . (3) an offer of a reasonable opportunity to
respond over the licensee's facilities.
1s 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1993). Section 315 provides that: If any
licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candi-
date for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall
afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that
office in the use of such broadcasting station.
19 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1993). Section 73.1930 provides
that: Where a licensee, in an editorial, (1) endorses or (2) op-
poses a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee
shall, within 24 hours after the editorial, transmit . . . (C) an
offer of reasonable opportunity for the candidate or a spokesman
of the candidate to respond over the licensee's facilities.
'0 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386-87.
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ernmental ("PEG") use. 1 Local authorities have the
right to deny a franchise to a potential cable opera-
tor2" if it does not promise to provide "adequate"
public, educational, and governmental access chan-
nels, facilities, and financial support.2" Conse-
quently, potential cable operators cannot build a fa-
cility without being used as an organ of the local
government.24 Nor can cable operators exercise any
editorial control over PEG programming."
Cable systems also are bound to carry local com-
mercial and noncommercial broadcast stations as
well as qualifying low power stations whose pro-
gramming meets with governmental approval.2" In
addition, cable operators are obligated to reserve
channel capacity to be leased by commercial pro-
grammers. 7 Finally, editorial discretion over the
content of the programming of the leased channel
also is prohibited.2"
A recent U.S. district court case, Daniels Cablevi-
sion, Inc. v. U.S.,29 upheld the constitutionality of
PEG and leased access regulations because the re-
quirements enable "a broad range of speakers to
2" 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
22 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (1988) (stating that a "cable oper-
ator may not provide cable service without a franchise").
22 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
24 See Century Fed. Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp.
1552, 1553 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1987), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S.
1053 (1988) (striking PEG requirements using strict scrutiny
partially because PEG channels are, in fact, controlled by the
government and "could very well provide a conduit for criticism
of the [cable] operator," which the operator would be forced to
carry).
PEG channels are compelled by the government and, unsur-
prisingly, serve the government. In Washington, D.C., District
Cablevision, to win the right to provide cable services, agreed to
dedicate three channels to PEG, along with funding. Of the an-
nual $1.8 million fund, 83% goes to the government channel.
The public shares the rest of the fund, plus occasional access to a
tiny, dilapidated studio with antiquated equipment.
Nearly a decade of such lopsided funding has allowed the
mayor's TV operation to expand into a mini-newsroom
outfitted with the latest in video equipment, a state-of-the-
art studio and a full staff - in other words, a reelection
engine that purrs, on your dime, 24 hours a day.
Christopher Georges, The Incumbents' Channel, WASH. POST,
July 17, 1994, at C1.
25 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) (1988).
20 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. IV 1993). The provision
requiring carriage of low power television stations is codified at
47 U.S.C. § 534(c). To qualify for carriage, low power stations
must "address local news and informational needs which are not
being adequately served by full power television broadcast sta-
tions." 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B).
27 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)(1) (1988). Mid-sized systems (36-54
activated channels) must reserve 10% of their free channels (i.e.,
channels that have not already been co-opted by must-carry or
PEG requirements or the use of which is prohibited by law). Id.
reach a television audience that otherwise would
never hear them."30
3. Direct Broadcast Satellite Servers
In one of its boldest forays into content control,
Congress commanded DBS providers to carry pro-
gramming of a specific subject matter, requiring
them to set aside four to seven percent of their chan-
nel capacity for "noncommercial programming of an
educational or informational nature."'" As of this
writing, one district court has held these require-
ments to be unconstitutional. 2
4. Telephone Companies' Video Platforms
Telephone companies ("telcos") suffer egregious
access requirements in providing video program-
ming. Currently, telcos are not permitted to offer
their own video programming directly to subscribers
in their calling region, 3  but may provide their own
Larger systems (50-100 activated channels) must dedicate 15%
of their free channels. Id. § 532(b)(1)(B). The systems with the
greatest capacity (over 100 activated channels) must dedicate
15% of all their channels for lease to commercial programmers.
Id. § 532(b)(1)(C).
28 47 U.S.C. § 532(c) (allowing cable operators to consider
content only in charging fees).
29 835 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993).
30 Id. at 6. Contra Century Fed. Inc., 710 F. Supp. at 1552;
Group W Cable v. Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954, 968-69 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (holding that the policies of the city of Santa Cruz,
CA of granting only a monopoly franchise and conditioning the
award of a franchise on the provision of concessions violated the
First Amendment).
3- 47 U.S.C. § 335 (Supp. IV 1993).
32 Daniels Cablevision, 835 F. Supp. at 8 (holding that "in
the absence of a record identifying a valid regulatory purpose or
some other legitimate government interest to be advanced by
conscripting DBS channel space, there is no justification for any
First Amendment burdens . . .").
22 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988). Section 533 provides that:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in
whole or in part to Subchapter II of this Chapter, to pro-
vide video programming ... directly or indirectly through
an affiliate owned by, operated by, controlled by, or under
common control with the common carrier.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, subject in
whole or in part to Subchapter II of this Chapter, to pro-
vide channels of communications or pole line conduit
space, or other rental arrangements, to any entity which is
directly or indirectly owned by, operated by, controlled by,
or under common control with such common carrier, if-
such facilities or arrangement are to be used for, or in
connection with, the provision of video programming di-




video services that are dissimilar to television pro-
gramming."' If telcos want to deliver video program-
ming, they must build a video platform"8 that is op-
erated as a common carrier. Compelled to carry the
programming of every other video provider, telcos
may find it impossible to show their own
programs.
36
Four U.S. district court opinions 7 recently have
found unconstitutional this prohibition against the
provision of video programming by telephone compa-
nies in their service area. Thus, four telcos have, for
the moment, the First Amendment right to build a
video system and choose their own programming.
However, based on recent congressional initiatives,"
these newly established speech rights may be
fleeting.
5. Print Media
Newspapers and magazines largely are exempted
from mandatory access requirements. The Supreme
Court has held that a government-compelled right of
access to a newspaper brings about a confrontation
with the express provisions of the First Amend-
ment."9  Despite the fact that newspapers and
magazines currently do not suffer mandatory access
requirements, there are those who have designs on
"Video programming" is defined as "programming provided by,
or generally considered comparable to programming provided
by, a television broadcast station." 47 U.S.C. § 522(19) (1994).
The FCC has interpreted this language "to prohibit only tele-
phone company provision of programming comparable to that
provided by broadcast television stations in 1984." In re Tele-
phone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Sec-
ond Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, para. 74 (1992)
[hereinafter Second Report and Order]. Telephone companies
are limited to a five percent ownership interest in providers of
video programming. Id. para. 71.
"' See 47 U.S.C. § 522(16) (1988) (prohibiting program-
ming that is comparable to that provided by broadcast television
stations); see also Second Report and Order, supra note 33,
para. 74.
a See Further NPRM, supra note 7, paras. 25-7.
e Second Report and Order, supra note 33, para. 10 (per-
mitting provision of video dialtone on a nondiscriminatory com-
mon carrier basis).
" Ameritech Corp. v. U.S., No. 93 C 6642 (N.D. 11. Oct.
27, 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. U.S., No. 93-B-2661-S (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 23, 1994); U.S. West v. U.S., 855 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D.
Wa. 1994), arid - F.3d - (9th Cir.); Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Co. v. U.S., 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993), arid - F.3d - (4th Cir.).
" See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. The legisla-
tive proposals and the House Reports do not make clear why
telephone companies are subject to lesser First Amendment
rights than other mass media video providers. The telephone
the news pages."
B. Legislative Proposals to Mandate Access
Existing mandatory access requirements may turn
out to be merely the first trickle from the collapse of
the constitutional dam. New and more comprehen-
sive access requirements are being offered. The fol-
lowing discussion provides a look at the current leg-
islative proposals.
1. Telephone Company Video Dialtone Systems
Under proposed legislation, telcos would be per-
mitted to create a separate affiliate to build a video
platform and to show its own programming."1 Even
then, however, a telephone company would be for-
bidden to exercise a key First Amendment
right-editorial control over unwanted program-
ming."2 Before it even may commence building, a
telco must assure the FCC that it is willing to meet
all programming demands for carriage of video pro-
gramming. 3 The telephone company must create
sufficient capacity to meet the demand of all "bona
fide requests" for carriage and then actually must
companies' status as a common carrier of point to point commu-
nications, cross-subsidization fears, and other antitrust consider-
ations neither explain nor justify restrictions on their speech. See
Lawrence H. Winer, Telephone Companies Have First Amend-
ment Rights Too: The Constitutional Case for Entry into Cable,
8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 257 (1990).
" Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
254 (1974).
" See Barron, supra note 2, at 1642; JEROME A. BARRON,
PUBLIc RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE PRESS (1981). SUNSTEIN,
supra note 2, at XIX.
41 H.R. 3626, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1994).
,' Id. § 635(b). Section 635(b) provides in pertinent part
that:
Within one year after the date of the enactment of this
section, the Commission shall prescribe regulations that
- (A) consistent with the requirements of section 659,
prohibit a common carrier from discriminating among
video programming providers with regard to carriage on
its video platform, and ensure that the rates, terms and
conditions for such carriage are just, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory ....
Section 635(F)(I) prohibits a common carrier "from discriminat-
ing among video programming providers with regard to material
or information provided by the common carrier to subscribers for
the purposes of selecting programming on the video platform, or
in the way such material or information is presented to
subscribers."
"' See id. § 653(a)(2).
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carry all such requests."" Additionally, telcos must
comply with the mandatory access provisions, such
as carriage of local broadcasters and commercial
leasing, to which the cable companies also are
subject.
2. Cable Operators
Ironically, under proposed legislation, those cable
operators who take the lead in building our nation's
advanced infrastructure will be penalized for their
investment. This is because upon constructing a
switched, broadband video programming delivery
system, cable operators would be subject to the same
common carrier requirements as telephone video
platforms.45 As a result, cable operators may be
stripped of even more of their right to choose the
programming shown on their systems.
3. All Video Providers - Senate Bill 2195"
One particularly ambitious bill introduced in this
past legislative session mandates access to all three of
the major video providers: cable television systems,
telephone companies, and DBS servers. Senate Bill
2195, The National Public Telecommunications In-
frastructure Act of 1994, compels cable companies,
telephone video platform providers, and DBS sys-
tems to set aside up to twenty percent of their capac-
ity to government, educational institutions, public li-
braries, and certain nonprofit entities.47 To qualify
for this preference, programming must provide "edu-
cational, informational, cultural, civic, or charitable
services directly to the public without charge for
such services." '48 In addition to free carriage, these
preferred entities also would receive funding. The
money would come from universal service funds and
taxes on telecommunication operators, as well as
from other sources.49 In short, public TV stations,
schools, and non-profit entities would be able to
place their educational and cultural programming on
all of the major sources of video programming free of
charge, and would be funded primarily by the tele-
4 Id. § 653(a)(3).
45 See id. § 653 (b)(2).
46 S. 2195, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
" See id. § 714(c)(1).
48 Id. § 714(d)(2).
49 See id. § 714(c)(1).
O S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
51 Id. § 201B(c)(1).
52 Id. § 201B(a). Section 201B(a) provides that:
The Commission shall promulgate regulations to require
communication companies themselves.
4. DBS, Telephone Video Platforms
Senate Bill 1822,50 passed by the Senate Com-
merce Committee, is similar to Senate Bill 2195, in
that both mandate access for the same entities (with
the exception of the governmental entities mandated
in Senate Bill 1822) and for the same program-
ming. 1 Senate Bill 1822, however, is somewhat less
generous with the assets of telecommunication com-
panies. It only confiscates up to five percent of the
capacity of a telecommunication entity and allows
the providers to charge enough to recover their out-
of-pocket costs. 2
II. MANDATORY ACCESS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The recent Supreme Court decision on the must-
carry rules, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC,5" examined the constitutionality of certain
mandatory access requirements. An analysis of Tur-
ner leads to the conclusion that mandatory access
proposals have serious, if not insurmountable, First
Amendment problems.
A. Turner Broadcasting and its Effect . on
Mandatory Access
In Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of the mandatory access
provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protec-
'tion and Competition Act of 1992 ("1992 Cable
Act").54 Sections 534 and 535 of the 1992 Cable Act
require cable television systems to reserve more than
one-third of their channels for the retransmission of
local commercial and noncommercial broadcast sta-
tions. 55 Cable company operators and programmers
responded by attacking the 1992 Cable Act on First
Amendment grounds before a three judge panel in
U.S. district court.56 The district court held that the
must-carry regulations were content-neutral and
owners and operators of telecommunications networks to
reserve, for public uses, up to 5% of the capacity on such
networks used for the delivery of information services, for
use by eligible entities at incremental cost based rates for
the delivery of information services to the general public.
8 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
" Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, 1465 (1992). (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59).
55 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35.
5 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp.
[Vol. 3
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therefore subject to intermediate constitutional scru-
tiny. The district court then concluded that the must-
carry rules survived intermediate scrutiny because
they were a narrowly tailored means of furthering a
significant government interest.57
The Supreme Court disagreed, in part, with the
district court's decision. The Court agreed that the
regulations were content-neutral because they were
not enacted to favor programming of a particular
content but rather, to preserve free over-the-air tele-
vision." The Court disagreed, however, that the gov-
ernment had proven that it met the test for content-
neutral regulations." Therefore, it vacated the judg-
ment and remanded the case to require the govern-
ment to prove that the fate of free television is in
serious jeopardy, and thus, that its preservation is a
real governmental interest."
If the government ii successful in proving these re-
quirements on remand, in order to prevail, it then
must prove that the must-carry regulations are a
narrowly tailored means of furthering this interest.
The Court intimated that if cable companies were
forced to drop some cable programming to make
room for certain broadcasters, this fact would be
''critical" to determining that the regulations are not
narrowly tailored. 1 As discussed infra Section II. B,
C and D, applying Turner Broadcasting to Con-
gress' latest mandatory access proposals reveals the
constitutional infirmities of the mandatory access
legislation.
B. Content Neutrality
Except for broadcast regulations,6 2 courts apply
32 (D.D.C. 1993).
67 Id. at 45-7.
" Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2461.
59 Id. at 2471-72.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 2472.
*s See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Communications
Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 796 (1978) (asserting
that regulations that are a reasonable means to further the pub-
lic interest in diversified mass communications, are
constitutional).
" Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989);
see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41,
48 (1986) (holding that a zoning limitation on the location of
adult theaters was "unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion" and, therefore, escaped strict scrutiny because the ordi-
nance was justified as a means of preventing various secondary
effects of adult theaters, like crime).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
* Id. The O'Brien test, as originally cast, also required that
the regulation be "within the constitutional power of the Gov-
either of two levels of scrutiny to speech restrictions.
If a law is content-neutral, it will be tested against
the intermediate level of scrutiny. A law is content-
neutral even if its operation censors or compels
speech, or its application is triggered by the content
of speech, if it is "justified without reference to the
content of the speech."" Thus, courts will look to
the justification, rather than the operation, of a law
to determine if it is content-neutral and, therefore,
subject to intermediate scrutiny. Under intermediate
scrutiny, a speech restriction will be upheld if it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental in-
terest,6' if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression,65 and if the re-
striction does not burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the governmental inter-
est.66 A restriction is not narrowly tailored if it does
not leave open ample alternative channels of commu-
nication.6 7 Moreover, the government will not be
able to sustain a speech restriction unless it "demon-
strates that the harms it recites are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree.""
If a law is content-based, it will be subject to the
higher standard of strict scrutiny. If the purpose of
the legislation is to compel or censor speech of a par-
ticular subject matter or viewpoint, the legislation is
content-based.'O Even if the government's purpose is
not to compel or censor speech, a law will be subject
to strict scrutiny if it "restrict[s] unduly" First
Amendment rights,70 or falls on a small group of
speakers.7 1 Under strict scrutiny, laws will be struck
down as unconstitutional, 72 unless the government
proves "that the regulation is necessary to serve a
ernment," and burden no more speech "than is essential to the
furtherance of the governmental interest." Id. The first of these
requirements has no independent significance and the latter has
been modified to require a looser fit between the regulation and
the governmental interest. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 791.
" Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
70 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2039 (1994) (holding
unconstitutional a residential sign ban because it prohibited "too
much protected speech" without determining whether the ban
was content-based or content-neutral); see also Simon &
Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509
(1991); Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner of Reve-
nue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1982).
"' Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
228-29 (1987).
72 See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1852 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (stating that a law subject to strict scrutiny
rarely survives such scrutiny).
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compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."
'
Mandatory access laws are unlikely to be deemed
content-neutral because, through them, some speech
is preferred and much is excluded. For example, the
mandatory access proposals of Senate Bill 1822 give
a programming preference to public television sta-
tions, public libraries, schools, and public access
channels, all of which are educational entities.7 4 Fur-
thermore, Senate Bill 2195 proposes to confiscate
channel space for governmental programming. 5 The
educational entities designated by these two bills are
entitled to access for educational programming only,
with such programming limited to the "provision of
educational, informational, cultural, civic, or charita-
ble services." '76 Cultural, civic, and charitable ser-
vices are not defined, but they appear to encompass
only speech of a more elevated and instructive level,
thus excluding all other types of speech. One clear
indicator of the content-based nature of the
mandatory access laws contained in these bills is that
such laws require the government to scrutinize the
content of the programming to see if it would be eli-
gible for mandatory access.7
The government, by singling out educational and
cultural speech over all other speech, clearly is mak-
ing a content preference. All speech involves the
communication of ideas and information. Educa-
" Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509; see also Arkansas
Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 231.
" The public access channel may be used only by nonprofit
entities that are "formed for the purpose of providing nondis-
criminatory public access to noncommercial educational, infor-
mational, cultural, civic, or charitable services." S. 1822, supra
note 13, 201B(c)(1). See also S. 2195, supra note 13,
§ 714(d)(1).
" S. 2195, supra note 13, § 714(d)(1).
76 Id. § 714(d)(2).
"" "Official scrutiny of the content of publications as the ba-
sis for imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press." Simon &
Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508 (quoting Arkansas Writers' Project,
481 U.S. at 221). See also FCC v. League of Women Voters,
468 U.S. 364, 383 (1983) (noting that one of "two central fea-
tures of the ban against editorializing [by public television sta-
tions] is that 'the scope of Section 399's ban is defined solely on
the basis of the content of the suppressed speech .... Conse-
quently, . . . enforcement authorities must necessarily examine
the content of the message that is conveyed' "). Id.
78 See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)
(holding that a statute that prohibited photographing currency,
but made an exception for "philatelic, numismatic, educational,
historical, or newsworthy purposes" was content-based and
therefore unconstitutional); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely,
408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (stating that "[alny restriction on expres-
sive activity because of its content" is invalid); West Virginia
tional speech involves the communication of academ-
ically accepted ideas and information. The govern-
ment may not, however, compel the carriage of
certain speech based on its perceived worth.78 Thus,
unlike the must-carry rules upheld in Turner Broad-
casting, which benefitted broadcasters of all pro-
gramming and were not strictly scrutinized "merely
because they treat[ed] operators and programmers
different from other components of the media,""
mandatory access laws that benefit only educational
programming are content-based and will be held to
the highest scrutiny.
Of course, laws that make content-based distinc-
tions may in fact be deemed content-neutral because
they are justified without reference to content. Pro-
ponents of mandatory access argue that access laws
are content-neutral because they are enacted for a
neutral reason: to create diverse voices in the
media.80
C. The Diversity Principle
The diversity principle,8 in the words of the Su-
preme Court, encourages "the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antago-
nistic sources. ' 82 The diversity principle does not
render access laws content-neutral, because access
laws do not increase diversity. The operation of ac-
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (de-
claring that, under the First Amendment, the state may not com-
pel schoolchildren to pledge allegiance to the flag). See also Na-
tional Ass'n of Indep. Television Producers and Distribs. v.
FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding valid cer-
tain exceptions to the Prime Time Access Rule's prohibition on
network programming for certain public affairs, documentary,
and children's programming, because of the FCC's broad power
over broadcasting and because broadcasters could choose not to
air the preferred programming).
70 Turner Broadcasting, 819 F. Supp. at 43.
80 See S. 2195, supra note 13, § 2(11). This section provides
in part that: "[a]ssuring access to a diversity of voices, view-
points, and cultural perspectives over telecommunications net-
works benefits all members of the public who use telecommuni-
cations networks to disseminate or receive information." Id. See
also S. REP. No. 367, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1994).
"' The diversity principle has been used successfully by the
government to justify various speech-related laws. See, e.g.,
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990)
(holding that the FCC may provide a preference for minority
broadcasters); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 374-79 (1969) (declaring that the FCC may require broad-
casters to give reply time to individuals subjected to personal at-
tacks); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 18-20
(1945) (stating that Associated Press ("AP") members may not
combine to refuse to supply non-AP members with news).
*' Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
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cess laws, in short, belies their justification. Even if
the government has an interest in creating access for
new voices in certain media,83 there is no justifica-
tion for limiting that access specifically to cultural,
educational, or governmental voices.8" The content-
based distinction between educational and noneduca-
tional speech is unrelated to the content-neutral pur-
pose of creating diverse voices and, as a result, the
diversity principle does not justify mandatory access
laws.
The diversity principle never has sustained laws
that prefer speech of a particular content. In Associ-
ated Press v. United States,"0 the seminal case on the
diversity principle, the government successfully used
antitrust laws to compel the Associated Press to sell
its news to competitors, on the theory that all of the
news -must be sold to all buyers."6 The fairness doc-
trine and its corollaries-the equal time rule, the
prime time access rule, and commercial time lim-
its-all seriously encroach on a broadcaster's right to
speak. None of these rules, however, forces a broad-
caster to air programming of a specific nature or
identified content. The must-carry rules, themselves
of undetermined constitutionality, made full-power
commercial and noncommercial broadcasters eligible
for carriage, regardless of their programming. These
laws alter the content of the affected medium, but do
not compel programming of a specified content.
Ultimately, proponents of mandatory access re-
quirements must prove the existence of a real, not
abstract, problem.87 They will rely on the diversity
principle, arguing that government has a compelling
interest in providing broad access for "a diversity of
voices, viewpoints, and cultural perspectives." 88 The
government must, therefore, prove that individuals
8 See Century Fed. Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp.
1552, 1555 (N.D. Cal. 1987), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1053
(1988). The court stated that :
[T~he [PEG] channels forced upon plaintiff by the Cities
carry the inherent risk that a franchisee's speech will be
chilled and the direct, undeniable impact of intruding into
the franchisee's editorial control and judgment of what to
cablecast and what not to cablecast. Neither result can be
tolerated under the First Amendment in the name of an
"attitude that government knows best how to fine tune the
flow of information to which [the people] have access".
" See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 510-11 (stating
that a compelling interest in compensating crime victims from
the fruits of crimes does not justify a statute that limits such
compensation to the proceeds of the wrongdoers' speech about
the crime only); Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 231, 231
(holding that an important interest in taxation does not justify a
statute that only taxes certain magazines and newspapers); Ca-
rey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464-65 (1980) (asserting that an
important interest in privacy does not justify a statute that only
do not have access to diverse voices.
Turner Broadcasting reveals that the government
will have difficulty proving that there is not a diverse
variety of voices. The government cannot prove that
access laws increase diversity simply by pointing out
that access laws by operation ensure greater variety
within the regulated medium. If so, the must-carry
rules could have been upheld on the same reasoning.
In light of the FCC's renunciation of the fairness
doctrine in 1985, on the ground that there is no scar-
city of broadcast outlets, 89 and the explosive growth
of the telecommunications industry since then, it is
difficult to conclude that lack of diversity is a real
problem. As a result, even truly content-neutral laws
that seek to increase the diversity of voices by mak-
ing all speech (even the non-educational kind) eligi-
ble for mandatory access, are unconstitutional.
D. Narrow Tailoring
Laws that compel speech must be narrowly tai-
lored so as not to burden other speech unnecessa-
rily.9 Senate Bill 2195, like other mandatory access
laws, may act to promote certain speech while silenc-
ing other speech. As the Supreme Court indicated in
Turner Broadcasting-
If there are fewer channels than programmers who want
to use the system, some programmers will have to be
dropped .... By reserving a little over one-third of the
channels on a cable system for broadcasters, [the 1992
Cable Act] ensured that in most cases it will be a cable
programmer who is dropped and a broadcaster who is
retained."
In Turner Broadcasting, the amount of cable-
prohibits nonlabor picketing).
s8 326 U.S. 1 (1944).
81 Id. at 20. The Court asserted that "[flreedom to publish
means freedom for all and not for some." Id.
67 See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (stating that
"[the Government] must do more than simply 'posit the exis-
tence of the disease . . . .' It must demonstrate that the recited
harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."
(internal citations omitted)).
88 S. 2195, supra note 13, § 2(12).
See In re Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station
WTVH, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Red. 5043,
para. 37 (1987), aff'd sub nom., Syracuse Peace Council v.
FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1019 (1990).
90 See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469; Ward, 491
U.S. at 799.




speech silenced by the must-carry rules was said- to
be a "critical" issue on remand." Mandatory access
laws like Senate Bill 2195, which co-opts twenty
percent of a video provider's capacity, face similar
constitutional hurdles if their carriage displaces other
speakers. Of course, even a content-neutral
mandatory access law will be unconstitutional on
these same grounds.
III. MANDATORY ACCESS AND GOVERN-
MENT SPENDING
The previous section described why mandatory ac-
cess proposals fail traditional First Amendment re-
view. This does not, however, end the debate.
Mandatory access proponents also seek to justify ac-
cess laws by invoking the government's spending
power.9" The government constitutionally may use
its money to fund speech of any particular content.
For example, while the government may not compel
a television station to air only anti-abortion commer-
cials, it may purchase a timeslot and air the adver-
tisement itself.9" Similarly, the government may im-
pose conditions on the receipt of benefits. 5 For
example, employees of a federally funded clinic may
be forbidden to engage in abortion counseling while
on the job.
9 6
Mandatory access proponents argue that the gov-
ernment's spending power should be used to save ac-
cess laws. They argue that use of the public rights-
of-way is a benefit and, therefore, the government
may condition the use of this benefit on carriage of
92 Id. at 2472.
See S. REP. No. 367, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1994).
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990) (providing
an overview of the constitutional distinction between government
spending and government regulation).
98 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 544-45 (1983) (holding that § 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, which grants a tax exemption to certain
nonprofit organizations, is not unconstitutional where Congress
simply decides not to subsidize Taxation with Representation of
Washington's (TRW) lobbying out of public funds).
" See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. The Court explained that:
[t]he Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund 'a program to encourage certain activities
it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same
time funding an alternate program which seeks to deal
with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Gov-
ernment has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it
has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of
the other.
Id.
" See, e.g., Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. United
States, 830 F. Supp 909, 919-21 (E.D. Va. 1993) (rejecting the
certain speech."' Proposed legislation points, to the
telecommunication entities' use of public rights-of-
way:9"
The builders of these new networks will use real public
property for laying copper wires, coaxial cable, and fiber
optic cable, and [will] use previously unused electromag-
netic frequencies. The public has a right to demand com-
pensation in the form of public access to such networks by
entities that provide substantial benefits to the public ....
The obligation to reserve capacity is a reasonable quid pro
quo for the right to use available public rights-of-way."
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the gov-
ernment's spending power cannot save mandatory
access provisions. One is the dissimilarity between
government spending and government grants of pub-
lic rights-of-way. The other is the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions.
A. Public Rights-of-Way
Government spending is not analogous constitu-
tionally to grants of public rights-of-way. When the
government subsidizes speech, either through direct
grants 00 or through tax exemptions,' 01  there is a
limit on how much speech is created and how much
is silenced. The amount of control that the govern-
ment exerts over speech is limited by the size and
duration of the grant or exemption. By contrast,
mandatory access regulations, in theory, create in the
government a perennial right of content control
through the one-time grant of a public right-of-
way. 02 For this reason, mandatory access laws are
argument that a telephone company, as a beneficiary of a gov-
ernment-sanctioned monopoly, has accepted a quid pro quo and
therefore may be prevented from providing cable television).
'8 S. 2195, supra note 13, § 2(13), requires owners and op-
erators of telecommunication networks (including cable, DBS,
and telephone companies) to reserve up to 20% of capacity in
exchange for "use of public right-of-ways." S. 1822, supra note
13 § 201B(a), reserves up to 5% of capacity on telephone com-
panies and DBS systems for public use "in exchange for the use
of public rights-of-way."
11 H. REP. No. 367, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1994).
100 See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 173.
01. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 449 U.S. 439 (1991); Ar-
kansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 221; Regan, 461 U.S. at
540.
102 Money grants and tax exemptions are a direct cost to
government and these spending decisions are subject to scrutiny
by voters and attack by political opponents. Therefore, spending
decisions are subject to political checks. In contrast, content-
based speech conditions on land use provide no natural limit to
the amount of speech either created or silenced, and no direct
cost to the taxpayers that would trigger periodic legislative re-
consideration. Laws that burden the media and are not subject to
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more analogous to traditional regulation than to
spending power actions.
B. Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
Even if a grant of a public right-of-way is a form
of government spending, the government still cannot
condition the use of such rights-of-way on
mandatory access. The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions forbids the government from requiring an
individual to relinquish a constitutional right on the
condition that the individual confer a discretionary
benefit on the government."'0 Thus, in Speiser v.
Randall,'0 the Supreme Court struck down a taxing
scheme that provided an exemption for veterans who
declared they did not advocate the overthrow of the
government.'0 5 Similarly, in Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject v. Ragland, the Supreme Court struck down a
tax on the media that exempted "religious, profes-
sional, trade and sports" publications."0 6 As the
Court explained in Leathers v. Medlock, selective
taxation is suspect constitutionally when it "discrimi-
nates on the basis of the content of taxpayer
speech."' '
Mandatory access laws that condition use of the
public rights-of-way on the carriage of educational
and cultural speech discriminate on the basis of con-
tent. Such laws threaten to "suppress the expression
of particular ideas or viewpoints."' 0 8 Because the
government constitutionally cannot compel a tele-
communications operator to carry particular pro-
gramming, it also cannot condition a benefit on the
operator for agreeing to carry such programming.
Most significantly, if a telecommunications com-
pany rejects the speech condition and, therefore, loses
the right-of-way, it is thereby completely silenced
political checks are invalid. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983) (holding invalid a tax applicable only to certain members
of the press). Leathers, 449 U.S. at 439, (stating that taxes that
apply "only to a single constituency [are] . . . insulated from . .
• political constraint"). In these cases, the Court discussed the
failure of political checks when the press' role as a government
watchdog is weakened and when small blocks of voters are dis-
proportionately burdened by regulation. This reasoning is appli-
cable to the loss of a political check that occurs when content-
based laws cost the public nothing, but escape First Amendment
review under the selective spending doctrine.
108 Dolan v. City of Tigard, US., 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317
.(1994).
104 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
100 Id. at 528-29.
10' Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 224.
.07 Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447.
108 Id.
within its chosen medium.0 9 Under all of the pro-
posed mandatory access laws, access is characterized
as a quid pro quo for the use of the right-of-way.
Telecommunication companies face a Hobson's
choice of either carrying the government's preferred
message or not speaking at all.
The government violates the Constitution when it
conditions a benefit on a grantee giving up speech,
unless the government makes available alternative
channels of expression.'" In FCC v. League of
Women Voters,"' public television stations that re-
ceived government funds were prohibited from all
editorializing." 2 The Court struck down the law,
stating that:
[a] noncommercial educational station that receives only
1% of its overall income from CPB [Corporation for Pub-
lic Broadcasting) grants is barred absolutely from all edi-
torializing .... [S]uch a station is not able to segregate its
activities according to the source of its funding. The sta-
tion has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to
all noneditorializing activities." a
Telecommunication companies, such as newspaper
and magazine publishers, simply are unable to dis-
tribute their product without using public rights-of-
way. Therefore, the government cannot condition the
use of these rights-of-way on the carriage of favored
programming.
IV. THE ESCALATION OF GOVERNMEN-
TAL CONTROLS
Professor Lawrence Tribe identified the dangers
of access requirements, asserting that such require-
ments invite "manipulation of the media by which-
ever bureaucrats are entrusted to assure access...
109 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994), in
which the court stated that:
[o]ur prior decisions have voiced particular concern with
laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression. Thus,
we have held invalid ordinances that completely banned
the distribution of pamphlets, within the municipality;
handbills on the public streets; the door-to-door distribu-
tion of literature; and live entertainment. . . .Although
prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely
free of content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger
they pose to the freedom of speech is readily apparent-by
eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures
can suppress too much speech.
Id. at 2045 (internal citations omitted).
110 Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-99.
111 468 U.S. 364 (1984).




and the danger of escalating from access regulation
to much more dubious exercises of government con-
trol."' " " Mandatory access is a clockwork orange; its
public interest veneer looks appealing, but contains
seeds for the luxuriant growth of content controls.
Unfortunately, government oversight suffers from
mission creep. One law inspires another. The broad-
cast television industry, in particular, has suffered
from the tightening grip of government control. The
government's power to define and parcel out portions
of the spectrum has evolved into the power to coerce
particular types of programming."15 For example,
the government broke new ground in content control
by enacting the Children's Television Act of 1990,1""
which limited advertising during children's television
programming 17 and mandated programming of an
educational and instructional content.11 ' If there is
any doubt about the intrusiveness of this Act, the
FCC's implementation of it should be conclusive. In
response to this Act, the FCC proposed mandates for
minimum amounts of educational broadcasting.11 9
The FCC also referred to legislative history for lists
of programming containing government-approved
themes and viewpoints, resulting in decisions that
made programs such as Fat Albert and Winnie the
Pooh and Friends acceptable,1 2 0 while making un-
suitable other programs, such as The Jetsons.
This progression from structural to content control
114 LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
1002 (1990).
"5 See FCC, Public Service Responsibilities of Broadcast
Licensees (1946) (establishing that a broadcaster's license would
hinge on whether the broadcaster met preferred programming
categories).
"s 47 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. IV 1993).
117 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(a) (Supp. IV 1993).
118 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. IV 1993).
118 The FCC has imposed an affirmative children's pro-
gramming obligation on broadcasters and has restricted the
amount of commercial time that may be placed in children's pro-
gramming. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's
Television Programming, Notice of Inquiry, 8 FCC Rcd. 1841
(1993) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry].
12o In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 2111, para.
26 (1991).
121 ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM
(1983).
122 Id. at 87.
122 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
124 EMORD, supra note 4, at 225. See also LUCAS POWE,
AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 121-
41 (1987) (documenting President Nixon's use of antitrust law
to silence anti-administration coverage by ABC, CBS and NBC).
President Nixon also advocated using the license renewal proce-
dure at the FCC to intimidate the Washington Post through the
was charted by Ithiel de Sola Pool in Technologies
of Freedom,""1 which discussed governmental control
over the postal system, a common carrier. The gov-
ernment's ministerial duties in protecting the postal
monopoly provided a handy cudgel for the imposi-
tion of content controls. At one point the government
prohibited, among other things, the mailing of intox-
icating liquor, liquor advertisements in places where
liquor was illegal, solicitations that resembled bills,
unsolicited contraceptives and advertisements for
contraceptives, prize fight films, lotteries, obscene
matter, sexually oriented advertisements, pandering
advertisements, etc.122 The Supreme Court finally
put an end to the most flagrant of the content con-
trols over the postal system.12- However, as one au-
thor noted, regarding governmental control over
other areas such as the media, "affording the govern-
ment authority to structure the media allows people
with political power to punish those whose views
they, dislike and to reward those whose views they
like." 
12
The evolution of structural regulations reveals the
escalation of government control. The Prime Time
Access Rule1 21 ("PTAR") was enacted to create di-
verse voices in the television broadcast industry.126 In
1975, the FCC modified the PTAR to. exempt from
its coverage public affairs and children's program-
ming. '2 Thus, the government used a structural reg-
Post's television stations. See CRAIG R. SMITH, THE DIVERSITY
PRINCIPLE: FRIEND OR FOE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 18
(1989). In another instance of government abuse, Congress
passed a law forbidding the FCC from extending any current
grants of temporary waivers from its multiple ownership rules.
EMORD, supra note 4, at 227. This law affected only an affiliate
of Rupert Murdoch's News America Publishing Inc., and evi-
dence adduced at trial revealed Congressional ill will against
Murdoch. Id. The court struck the provision as violative of the
Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause. Id.
128 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1993). Section 73.658(k) pro-
vides in pertinent part that:
[Clommercial television stations owned by or affiliated
with a national television network in the 50 largest televi-
sion markets . . . shall devote, during the four hours of
prime time, .... no more than three hours to the presenta-
tion of programs from a national network, programs for-
merly on a national network (off-network programs) other
than feature films, or, on Saturdays, feature films.
The constitutionality of PTAR was upheld in Mt. Mansfield
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971). The FCC
has launched a proceeding to review the prime time access rule.
In re Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, MM Dkt. No. 94-123 (Oct. 25, 1994).
126 In re Docket No. 12782, Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.
2d 382, 394 (1970).
127 In re The Prime Time Access Rule, § 73.658(k), Second
Report and Order, 50 F.C.C. 2d 829 (1975).
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ulation as -a vehicle to reflect its content preferences.
Similarly, the must-carry rules of the 1992 Cable
Act'2 " deny must-carry status to television stations
that are "[p]redominantly utilized for the transmis-
sion of sales presentations or program length com-
mercials." 2 Low power television stations are given
a chance at must-carry privileges, if their program-
ming meets governmental standards.1 3
In a related area, the FCC's 1972 cable access
laws provided for first-come non-discriminatory ac-
cess on public access channels.' 31 The mandatory ac-
cess proposals outlined in Section I. B. of this Article
confiscate the same channel space from cable opera-
tors, but reserve the space for preferred educational
speech. During the second session of the 103d Con-
gress, one senator attached a provision to a telecom-
munications bill that would force cable operators to
scramble any programming on their channels that
138 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, (1992) (codified at
47 U.S.C. §§ 521-59.
129 47 U.S.C. § 534(g)(1)(1992). Section (g)(2) directs the
FCC to conduct a proceeding to ascertain whe.ther such stations
are serving the public interest, convenience, and necessity. If so,
must-carry status is conferred. Id. § 534(g)(2).
130 The provision requiring carriage of low power television
stations is codified at 47 U.S.C. § ,534(c). Under 47 U.S.C.
§,534 (h)(2)(B), low power stations to qualify for carriage must
"address local news and informational needs which are not being
adequately served by full power television broadcast stations."
131 See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708
(1978) (holding that, because the FCC's access rules- were not
"reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of [its] various
responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasters," the
Commission was precluded from compelling cable systems to act
as common carriers).
132 S. 1822, supra note 13. S. 1822 was passed by the Senate
Commerce Committee and was amended to increase the penalty
for obscenity on telecommunications devices from $10,000 to
$100,000. See Jenny Honz, Groups Hit Senate Bill Restrictions,
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Aug. 22, 1994, at 23.
1. In a classic example of coerced voluntarism, an FCC
Chairman met with the three major broadcast networks and per-
suaded them to implement the "family viewing hour," an hour
of non-violent programming. This informal coercion was held to
be unconstitutional. Writers Guild of America v. FCC, 423 F.
Supp. 1064 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 609 F.2d 355 (9th
Cir. 1979).
13 Only final agency action and agency action made review-
able by statute are subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 704
(1988).
,135 Cable franchisees have been less willing to challenge mu-
nicipal regulations than FCC regulations because municipal reg-
ulations are a tolerable exchange for market protection. EMORD,
supra note 4, at 250-51.
1I8 S. REP. No. 103-367, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 99 (1994)
(stating that "broadcasters and television networks operate their
business subject to many complex rules limiting their freedom to
grow and diversify").
they deem to be "unsuitable for children.' '1 8 2 In
short, mandatory access laws that are not themselves
the vehicles for content preferences often evolve into
such.
Even more insidious than the escalation from
structural to content controls, are governmental
threats and informal coercion. A regulated industry
is vulnerable to threats and informal coercion be-
cause its financial viability is controlled by the gov-
ernment.-' Moreover, the informality of government
action 3 and the industry's dependence on govern-
ment licensing and other authorization"' make later
judicial challenge unlikely.
The broadcast industry is a good example of an
industry susceptible to informal coercion. 3 Decades
of governmental oversight have hampered broadcast
competitiveness and this trend continues today.'
3 7
Recently, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt publicly
137 Content controls often prevent broadcasters from provid-
ing a product best tailored to the market. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(b) (Supp. IV 1993) (directing the FCC to consider the
extent to which a license renewal applicant has "served the edu-
cational and informational needs of children"); Pub. L. No. 102-
'356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 954 (1992) (note following 47 U.S.C.
§ 303 (Supp. IV 1993) (setting restrictions on indecent pro-
gramming during certain hours); 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1988) (al-
lowing license grants. "if the public interest, convenience or ne-
cessity will be served thereby"); 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1994)
(making license renewal contingent on findings that include citi-
zenship and character); 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1993) (prohibit-
ing commercial TV stations in the 50 largest markets from de-
voting more than three of the four prime time hours to network
programs); 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988) (allowing the FCC to
revoke a broadcast license or construction permit for willful fail-
ure or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to broadcast
airtime for candidates seeking elective office); 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1920 (1993) (requiring broadcasters to notify victims of on-
air personal attacks and to provide victims with a reasonable op-
portunity to respond over-the-air); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1993)
(requiring a broadcaster who endorses or opposes a candidate to
notify an opponent and provide a reasonable opportunity to re-
spond); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (1993) (requiring a broadcaster
who allows candidates to use its facilities to afford equal oppor-
tunities to all other candidates for that office to use the facilities);
47 C.F.R. § 73.1942 (1993) (requiring broadcasters to sell ad-
vertising time to candidates at the lowest unit charge of the sta-
tion); In re Programming Inquiry, Report and Policy Statement,
44 F.C.C. 2d 2303, 2312 (1960) (requiring broadcasters to air
programming that serves "the public interest, convenience or
necessity").
Structural regulations also have deleterious effects on broad-
casters' autonomy and profit potential. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.
§ 303(b) (Supp. IV, 1993) (setting advertising limits on the du-
ration of children's television programming); 47 U.S.C. § 533
(1988) (prohibiting a television broadcaster from owning a cable
system in its own market); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1993) (limit-
ing the total number of broadcast stations (AM, FM or TV)
that one can own in any given market ("multiple ownership
19951
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stated that it is time to take a "fresh look" at the
"csocial compact between the public and the broad-
casting industry." 38 Chairman Hundt wants televi-
sion violence reduced and educational programming
for children increased' 39-measures the First
Amendment makes suspect constitutionally. Broad-
casters are soliciting government assistance to remove
onerous restrictions on spectrum use and media own-
ership,14 and to ease the transition to high definition
television ("HDTV"). In the trading, backing, and
filling, the potential for harm is real."4
The government's capacity to do harm is even
greater with regard to information networks such as
the Internet, which also is affected by proposed legis-
lation. 42 The evils of escalating controls and coerced
"voluntarism" only will increase as the government
gets a firm grip on the information infrastructure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mandatory access laws have serious First Amend-
ment problems and set an ominous precedent for fu-
ture government regulation and coerced voluntarism.
Mandatory access proponents base their arguments
on the perceived poor quality of the news media.
The premise of the access argument is, however, at
odds with the reality of greater programming choices
of higher program quality. The greater the number
of commercial programmers, the greater the quality
and diversity of programming. Governmental efforts
rule"), limiting the ownership of a television station to one per
market ("duopoly rule"), limiting ownership of a daily newspa-
per by a regional broadcaster ("daily newspaper cross ownership
rule"), limiting the total number of broadcast stations one can
own nationwide)); 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1993) (prohibiting
broadcast networks from owning financial interests in programs
they obtain from outside sources); 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(g) (1993)
(prohibiting the ownership of more than one television network).
Congress has proposed legislation to remove the ownership rules.
See, e.g., S. 1822, supra note 13, § 701.
... Kim McAvoy, Hundt's New Deal, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 1, 1994, at 6.
189 Kim McAvoy, Hundt's Social Compact: "It Scares the
Hell Out of Me," BROADCASTING & CABLE, Aug. 8, 1994, at
14.
140 Id.
141 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 115. Sunstein asserts
that:
[clitizens may often find it in their interest to give up the
right to free speech in return for government benefits. But
if government is permitted to obtain a number of enforce-
able waivers of the free speech right, the aggregate effect
may be substantial, and the deliberative processes of the
public will be skewed. This skewing effect is intolerable
even if individual citizens voluntarily agree to waive their
rights.
to compel carriage of certain programming are
counterproductive because they threaten the viability
of the regulated industries. There is an inverse rela-
tionship between costs placed on telecommunications
companies and the number of programming choices
they can offer. Mandatory access laws may have the
effect, therefore, of reducing program quality.
Those who complain about the current status of
video programming and who attempt to use the force
of law to gain access for approved programming, are
mourning what they perceive to be the failure of the
marketplace of ideas. This perception is fundamen-
tally at odds with the First Amendment, which is
premised on the belief that the truth emerges from
open debate,14 and does not allow the government to
prefer certain programming because of its perceived
higher quality. Government-mandated access creates
new speaking opportunities for some, at the expense
of denying First Amendment rights to others.
The belief that the marketplace of ideas has failed
is a value judgment most likely shared by everyone
whose speech is rejected or ignored. In this case, the
judgment is wrong. The existence of highly-com-
mended programming such as A&E, Bravo, CNN,
C-SPAN, C-SPAN II, The Discovery Channel, and
The Learning Channel, to name just a few, proves
that the marketplace of ideas has not deteriorated.
The maturing of the DBS and telephone video plat-
form industries promises to increase the supply of
high-quality programming.
Id.
*14 H.R. 3626, supra note 41, § 308. This bill directs the
Commission to:
study policies that will enhance civic participation through
the national information infrastructure . . . . The study
shall examine but is not limited to, the social benefits of
flat rate pricing for access to computer and data networks,
the policies which will determine how access to computer
networks will be priced . . . and the appropriate role of
common carriers in the development of national computer
and data networks.
Id. S. 1822, reserves five percent capacity on "telecommunica-
tions networks" that transmit or carry "information services, in-
cluding video services." Id. §§ 201(B)(a), (d). Thus, the legisla-
tion would appear to apply to information networks like the
Internet. The legislation does not, however, explain how one cal-
culates five percent of capacity on a switched network. In addi-
tion, S. 1822 would allow the FCC to create a separate defini-
tion of universal service only applicable to schools, libraries,
health care facilities, museums, and public broadcast stations. Id.
§ 201(C)(a). S. 1822 also directs the Commission to "enhance..
• the availability of advanced telecommunication and information
services" and to provide such entities with preferential rates. Id.
§ 201(C)(b).
""' See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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More fundamentally, even if the entire video mar-
ketplace was comprised solely of situation comedies
and game shows, governmental attempts to rectify
the situation by coerced carriage of preferred pro-
gramming would be contrary to the philosophical
foundation of the First Amendment. Such attempts
would ignore the fact that freedom of expression is a
birthright, not a privilege earned by the quality of
one's speech. The First Amendment protects equally
the insightful, the tedious, and the inane. The First
Amendment is a shield to protect us all, not a sword
144 Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 163 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
to silence some.
Like using the Bible as a bludgeon, it is a gro-
tesque misuse of the First Amendment to use it to
make distinctions among speakers based on the per-
ceived quality of their speech. Access laws, which
use the force of government to strip editorial discre-
tion from some, to silence others, and to promote the
speech of a few, reflect a vision of the First Amend-
ment "that is agreeable to the traditions of nations
that have never known freedom ....
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